Abstract-IEEE 802.16m Multihop relay network is assiduously developing to accomplish high capacity services with large cell coverage. However due to lack of physical boundaries and injection of distributed relays, it is known to be more vulnerable to security holes as a trade off. In this paper we propose a new distributed authentication key scheme for Multihop Relays IEEE 802.16m network service. The propose scheme uses decode and forward relays with localized authentication. The scheme works in distributed authentication to authenticate Subscriber station (SS) and Relay stations (RS) at initial network entry. Our new imprpoved distributed scheme utilizes healthy security issues and the Multihop Relay network application features. Both analysis and performance evaluation shows that our scheme can significantly increases the network throughput and reduce the security holes as well as communication overheads.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless networks have become more and more pervasive due to their many advantages. The IEEE 802.16 standard aims to provide broadband wireless access (BWA) for metropolitan area network (MAN), and is to design for the delivery of last mile BWA is alternative to the cable and DSL. To support BWA, high data transmission is necessary. Here we assume that relays is operating in non-transparent distributed scheduling and security mode, which can show better performance then other RS [1] . At the same coin, wireless networks represent an important example of such scenarios where capturing and forging packets is relatively easy; attacks against such networked system are becoming more complex and powerful. Thus, security is essential in wireless technologies to allow rapid adoption and enhance their maturity, while designing the standard, the IEEE 802.16 working group has taken into consideration the security aspects to avoid mistakes of IEEE 802.11. Standard security specifications can mainly be found within the MAC layer which is called security sublayer. The separate security sublayer provides authentication, secure key exchange and encryption. IEEE 802.16 employs a concept of security association (SA) which defines security parameters keys and encryptionalgorithms. First, the authorization SA, though not explicitly defined by the standard, consists of an X.509 certificate, an authorization key (AK), a key encryption key (KEK) and a hash message authentication code (HMAC) key, which will be used for authorization, authentication and key management. Second, the data SA for transport connections consists of a SA identifier (SAID), a cipher; traffic encryption keys (TEKs) and initialization vectors for TEKs, which will be used for secure data transmission as IEEE 802.16j. In a Multihop Relay network, when an SS is accessing a BS through RS, the RS should do the same authentication function on behalf of the BS. In contract to basic standard, where the routing is only done at BS. IEEE 802.16e is not doubt vulnerable to securities threats and has several possible solutions but after the injection of RSs in the standard, make it again open for the attacker to play with the system like rogue RS station. Interleaving attack and replay attack was unsolved issues in IEEE 802.16e. This paper gives the overview of securities issues on Multihop Relay networks, such as Replay attacks, Denial of Service (DoS) and interleaving attacks. The rest of the paper is organized as follow. In section 2 related works on securities issues on Multihop Relay network are introduced. In section 3, we discuss different securities issues of IEEE 802.16j. Section 4 discussed Proposed distributed authentication scheme in detail. In section 5, we analysis of the proposed distributed authentication scheme. Section 6 evaluates the performance of section 3. We follow up with a conclusion and acknowledgment in section 7&8 respectively.
II. RELATED WORKS
Wimax presents a range of security vulnerabilities. Since the first Amendment was released on MR specifications [2] , a few papers have been published to introduce and address the security issues. There are some papers that review this standard in details such as [2] and [3] . Sen Xu and Manton Mathews published a series of work like [4] and [5] on security issues on the standard as well as on Privacy key Management protocols (PKM). Karen Scarfore with his team come up with a special publication on Guide to security for Wimax technologies(Draft) which was the recommendations of the national institute of standards and technology(NIST). Taeshik Shon, Wook Choi [6] discussed about the Analysis of Mobile Wimax Security, Vulnerabilities and Solutions. Y.Lee and H.K.Lee in their paper [7] gives more focus on hybrid authentication scheme and key distribution for MMR in IEEE 802.16j. Other papers like [8] , [9] gives more detailed pictures of efficient rekeying algorithms. The authors [10] , [11] and [12] review the standard and analyzed its security in many aspects, such as vulnerabilities in authentication and key management protocols and failure in data encryption. In [12] the PKM protocol is discussed in details, more attacks on the versions of the PKM protocols listed in [1] , [10] and [13] . In IEEE 802.16mstandard, Multihop Relay (MR) is an optional deployment in which a BS in (802.16e) may be replaced by a Multihop Relay BS (MR-BS) and one or more relay stations (RS). The MR mechanism provides several advantages, such as providing additional coverage for the serving BS, increasing transmission speed in an access network, providing mobility without SS handover, decreasing power consumption when transmitting and receiving packets, and enhancing the quality of services [14] . However none of these above publications cover the security in non-transparent Relays in distributed environment in a detailed way.
III. PROPOSED DISTRIBUTED AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
When an access RS is operating in non-transparent distributed security mode, the authentication key established between SS/RS and BS is distributed to this NT-ARS, Usually BS periodically broadcast DL-MAP MM. RS/MS scan those MM and send the request to neighbor facilitator BS/RS, however, when an NT-ARS is operating in distributed security mode, the authentication key established between SS and BS is distributed to this NT-ARS. An NT-ARS operating in this mode relays initial PKM messages between the BS and SS/RS. When the master session key (MSK) is calculated by BS and NT-ARS and fully established, then BS shall securely transfer the relevant authorization key (AK) to its NT-ARS. NT-ARS derives all the necessary keys and start traffic encryption key (TEK) with SS/RS. NTARS first join the network by sending its authentication information message and as usual BS may ignore this message , however, immediately it send authorization request message to BS, in response , BS generate AK0 to reply to NT-ARS as shown in Fig 2. Once NT-ARS achieve AK0 from BS, it is now eligible to facilitate its neighboring NT-ARS/SS/RS with its own generated AK01. We assume that system is having more then two hops. NT-ARS2 is ready to derive its own AK02 to transfer upon authentication request from SS/RS. At this stage, if any SS2 send authentication request to NT-ARS, for sure it will be acknowledged with AK02. Now, SS2, (NT-ARS1 & NTARS2) and BS have AK02, AK01 and AK0 respectively.
The main responsibility of SS is to refresh its AK by making an authorization request periodically to the NT-ARS to avoid service interruptions during reauthorization. Successive generations of the SS's AKs have overlapping lifetime. SS need to support up to two simultaneously active AKs during this transition period with NT-ARS but NT-ARS need to support up to four simultaneously active AKs during the transition period with BS and other NT-ARS /SS/RS. The BS shall always be prepared to start reauthentication upon request. The BS shall be able to support two simultaneously active AKs for each client NT-ARS/SS/RS. Now NT-ARS has four active AKs during an AK transition period; the four active keys have overlapping lifetimes. AK transition period begins when the NT-ARS receives an Auth Request message from an NT-ARS /SS/RS and the NT-ARS has a double active AK for that SS/RS. On the other hand, NT-ARS need to maintain two active keys with BS to remain authenticated. In response to the Auth Request from SS/RS, the NTARS activates a second AK which shall have a key sequence number one greater (modulo 16) than that of the existing AK and shall be sent back to the requesting SS/RS in an Auth Reply message as shown in Fig 1. The NT-ARS shall set the active lifetime of this second AK to be the remaining lifetime of the first AK plus the predefined AK Lifetime; thus, the second, "newer" key shall remain active for one AK Lifetime beyond the expiration of the first, "older" key. The key transition period shall end with the expiration of the older key. As long as the NT-ARS is in the center of an SS/RS AK transition period, and thus is holding two active AKs for that /SS/RS, and two active AKs with BS, it shall respond to Auth Request messages with the newer of the twoactive keys. Once the older key expires, an Auth Request shall trigger the activation of a new AK, and the start of a new key transition period as shown in Figiure 2 
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IV.
ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED DISTRIBUTED AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
A. Denial of Service
Dos attacks on the BS/NT-ARS could happen during the PKMv2 authentication because of the heavy public key computational load. Here, we assume that the attacker is external to the network and is able to analyze the unencrypted parts of the management traffic and observes the timing, size, and source of traffic. Attacker can prevent or hinder communication with little effort by disrupting certain important packets. All messages communicated prior to secure key exchange between BS and NT-ARS/SS/RS are not authenticated. In our distributed authentication scheme, BS authenticate NT-ARS and create a trustworthy environment and securely subordinate RS and securely transfer the AK , which minimize the chances of DoS in the network.
B. Replay attack
In a replay attack, the attacker captures a transmitted message and resends it after certain amount of time, for example, BS/NT-ARS may face a replay attack from an adversary who intercepts and saves the authentication messages sent by legitimate NT-ARS/SS/RS previously. In our proposed authentication key scheme, for NTARS, MAC header contains CID field of NT-ARS which is incremented after each new session. Thus as a hopby-hop or localized authentication scheme, this leads to the break down of the replay attack. If NT-ARS/BS repeats a transmission with same CID, it will negotiate a new set of secret keys requiring the recalculation of HMAC digest thus maintain the trustworthy environment within network.
C. Interleaving Attack
In IEEE 802.16 network, for the attacker to accomplish the interleaving attack, only two problems were left. First, the AK in PKMv2 is derived from Pre-AK with the MAC address of BS and SS. To mimic MAC address of BS and SS is not the big deal in wireless networks. Second, PKMv2 uses AAA server to bind a securely session, this can also be counterfeit or replayed by attacker to SS [5] . In IEEE 802.16m Multihop networks, number of wireless devices engross is increased, thus produce wide space for interleaving attack. In our proposed scheme NT-ARS acts as BS to its subordinate RS or SS, that's why BS need to achieve full confidence of trust on NT-ARS prior to sending any messages to its SS. It's just like a localized authentication, for single hop, interleaving attack is a bit tricky [5] . Once NT-ARS is successfully authenticated by BS then it ought to be allowed to decode and forward all the messages from BS to other RS or SS.
D. Communication Cost
The communication cost of our proposed scheme consists of two phases, the AUTH-REQ and AUTH-REP phase. In AUTH-REQ phase, the source NRS send its AUTH-REQ as well as others NRS AUTH-REQ directly via one hop to the MR-BS and this type of authentication occurs once for specific NRS as after authentication, source NRS is responsible for authenticating others NRS who already get their AK/SAID. So the communication cost of sending AUTH-REQ with refreshing AK/TEK can be calculated as follow where H is the average number of Hops between the source and the destination, n is the number of NRS participating in the entire mesh network, certificate size is important parameter to be count as NRS also combine others AUTH-REQ with their digital certificates. As all the AK/SAID/TEK of different NRS is stored in the local repositories of NRS at any time. To replay AUTH-REQ message thus saves the bandwidth of the first hop. In the AUTH-REP phase, MR-BS send its AUTH-REP message to its neighbor NRS with AK/SAID, this message is unicast altogether with separate other AK/SAID for other requesting NRS. Once NRS get AK/SAID from MR-BS it encrypt it with public key of requesting NRS, save the copy to its local repository and send it back to requesting NRS. The requesting NRS maintains it's AK/TEK with single hop with serving NRS, thus save bandwidth, the communication cost of this phase can be calculated as follows So the total communication cost of AUTH-REQ and AUTH-REP phases can be calculated as follow:
.
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V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To demonstrate the feasibility of the previously illustrated attacks and countermeasures. The approach of our result is to evaluate the most vulnerable hop in IEEE 802.16m Multihop network by using our improved distributed authentication key scheme. We observed as NT-ARS is not healthy complex and intelligent, even in the secured environment, more given attacks were found in between NT-ARS and SS/RS communication as compared to the attacks found in between BS and NT-ARS. However, unsecured environment seems to be most vulnerable. Our distributed authentication scheme proves to be powerful against above mentioned attacks. We simulate for denial of service by using our algorithm, the above graph shows that throughput increases when we use our algorithm.
VI. Conclusion
Although IEEE 802.16 has very robust and promising security architecture, still there are some slots which need to be sort out. As in the case, IEEE 802.16mMultihop Relays networks, if the number of devices or Hops increases, highly unreliability increase, which ascends to the extensive field for the attacker to fool around. Here, in this paper, NT-ARS acts as BS and is just a subset of it; BS with its strong, intelligent and complex nature as well as organized backhaul support is less vulnerable. We have discussed three severe attacks on existing standard, DoS, Replay and interleaving attacks. The proposed authentication scheme where NT-ARS act as SS to BS, MSK is calculated at NT-ARS and BS initially, then BS securely transfers AK to NT-ARS. Once NT-ARS is successfully authenticated, it start doing the same steps with further to NT-ARS/SS/Subordinate RS, rather then directly transfer MSK to SS via NT-ARS where the probability of above given attacks befall more high. Our finding also includes the communication cost which is identical as the standard that makes this scheme more powerful and efficient as well.
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